City Court of New York, City of Watertown: People v. Saldana by Ayvazian, Ara K.
Touro Law Review 
Volume 27 
Number 3 Annual New York State Constitutional 
Issue 
Article 11 
October 2011 
City Court of New York, City of Watertown: People v. Saldana 
Ara K. Ayvazian 
ara-ayvazian@tourolaw.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ayvazian, Ara K. (2011) "City Court of New York, City of Watertown: People v. Saldana," Touro Law Review: 
Vol. 27 : No. 3 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/11 
This Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital 
Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of 
Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
CITY COURT OF NEW YORK
CITY OF WATERTOWN
People v. Saldanat
(decided December 7, 2009)
Jason Saldana was arrested two days after the Watertown City
Fire Department and the Watertown Police Department found evi-
dence of a marijuana growing operation in his home.2 At trial, Mr.
Saldana sought to suppress the marijuana cultivation evidence on the
basis that the police obtained the evidence without a warrant absent
any emergency exceptions to the warrant requirement, therefore vi-
olating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution3 and
article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution.4 The trial
court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment because the
police's warrantless search and seizure did not satisfy any of the
emergency exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and the evidence
obtained was not subject to the inevitable discovery doctrine due to
the nature of the seizure.'
In the early evening of August 30, 2009, a fire broke out at
the residential unit owned by the defendant, Jason Saldana.6 The
Watertown Fire Department and Watertown Police Department Of-
ficer Frederick March responded to the call.7 The fire department ex-
tinguished the fire and, while performing the usual search of the resi-
' No. 43564, 2009 WL 4667446 (N.Y. City Ct. Dec. 7, 2009).
2 Id. at*l.
3 The Fourth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
4 The New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, house, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ".N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 12.
5 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *2, 5.
6 Id. at * 1.
Id.
685
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dence for victims or signs of arson, came upon a marijuana cultiva-
tion operation.! The fire department notified Officer March that it
discovered something on the third floor.9 Officer March was brought
up to the location of the fire and observed in plain view, a marijuana
growing operation containing fifteen marijuana plants.'
Officer March returned downstairs and questioned Saldana
about what was in the attic." Saldana initially claimed "he was
growing pumpkins and vegetables."l 2 Approximately an hour and a
half after Officer March responded to the scene, Saldana admitted to
cultivating marijuana in a supporting deposition and gave "the police
permission to search [the] house and collect the marijuana." 3 After
this supporting deposition was obtained, another officer arrived and
collected the contraband as evidence.14 Subsequently, Saldana was
charged with marijuana cultivation.15
During preliminary proceedings, Saldana filed a motion ar-
guing that the indictment should be dismissed because the officer's
entry and search of his residence was illegal and therefore all evi-
dence seized should be suppressed.' 6 In response, the People filed an
affidavit "stating that the search was lawful under either the emer-
gency or inevitable discovery exceptions to [the] federal and state
warrant requirements."' 7
The central issue at trial regarded Officer March's warrantless
search of Saldana's home.' 8 The city court first analyzed whether the
search of Saldana's home by Officer March fell into one of the vari-
8 Id.
to Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *1.
1 Id.
12 id.
13 Id
14 id
's Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *1.
16 Id. Additionally, Saldana contested the constitutionality of the supporting deposition
that he gave to Officer March. Id. at *I n.2. However, the City Court of New York decided
not to consider the issue of whether the consent was valid. Id. For a more in depth analysis
of the issue of retroactive consent and how it impacts the legality of a warrantless search, see
Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Effect of Retroactive Consent on Legality of Otherwise
Unlawful Search and Seizure, 76 A.L.R.5th 563 (2004).
" Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *1.
18 Id.
[Vol. 27686
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ous emergency exceptions to the warrant requirement.19 Explaining
that emergency exceptions have been used "when public safety con-
cerns eclipse those of privacy," the judge concluded that the search of
Saldana's residence did not fall into the exceptions for two reasons.20
First, no emergency situation existed at the time the officer entered
Saldana's home. 21 Second, the officer's "apparent intent was to in-
vestigate a crime, not to provide emergency services."22 The judge
referred to the officer's testimony to show this intent and state of
mind: "I was advised by City Fire that there was something I should
see in the attic. I was advised that it look [sic] like they were grow-
ing something in the attic, which was a bedroom." 23
Subsequently, the judge analyzed the People's second argu-
ment that "even if Officer March's search wasn't properly sanc-
tioned, the marijuana plants should be admitted pursuant to the in-
,,24 Uo eiwn
evitable discovery doctrine. Upon reviewing the inevitable
discovery doctrine, the judge held that the state did not meet the bur-
den required for the marijuana plants to be submitted as evidence into
trial.25
"9 Id. at *2.
20 id.
21 Id. ("Officer March entered Mr. Saldana's home after the fire was put out.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
22 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *3.
23 id
24 Id. at *4.
25 Id. at *4-5. The New York Court of Appeals has stated that under the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine:
[E]vidence obtained as a result of information derived from an unlawful
search or other illegal police conduct is not inadmissible under the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine where the normal course of police investi-
gation would, in any case, even absent the illicit conduct, have inevitably
led to such evidence.
People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139, 141 (N.Y. 1973). Saldana cited to the leading
precedent on inevitable discovery in New York, People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y.
1987), to reference the distinction between primary and secondary evidence. Saldana, 2009
WL 4667446, at *4. Stith held that the inevitable discovery doctrine could only be applied to
secondary evidence. Stith, 506 N.E,2d at 914. The limitation of applying the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine only to secondary evidence illustrates the seminal difference between the
application of this doctrine under New York and federal law. For further extrapolation of
this doctrine as applied to People v. Saldana, see Ara Ayvazian, City Court of New York,
City of Watertown, People v. Saldana, 27 Touro L. Rev. 631 (2011). See also United States
v. Pimentel, 810 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1987); cf Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984)
(holding that the "[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been discov-
ered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial;" thus the Court held
3
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After analyzing the warrant requirements under both the Unit-
ed States and New York Constitutions, the emergency exceptions the-
reto, and the inevitable discovery doctrine, the court held that the
warrantless search by Officer March was illegal and that the evidence
of marijuana cultivation was inadmissible.26 As a result of the
court's decision, Saldana's motion to dismiss was granted.27
The genesis of scrutiny surrounding post-fire emergency ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirements is seen in the Supreme Court
decision, Michigan v. Tyler.2 8 Tyler is the landmark authority on
post-fire searches and the seminal decision listing guidelines neces-
sary to be followed for a legal search and seizure. 29 In Tyler, approx-
imately three hours after a fire broke out and while the fire depart-
ment was watering down the smoldering embers, the fire chief
arrived to determine the cause of the fire. 30 The chief was informed
that two containers of flammable liquid had been found at the scene,
and he communicated the information to the police based on his sus-
picion of arson. 3' The police and the chief took photographs of the
scene, but returned to investigate the arson five hours later, after the
fire was extinguished and the firefighters had left.32 During this
second investigation they uncovered evidence suggestive of a fuse
trail. Three weeks later, a Michigan State policeman returned to
investigate and found a piece of fuse and further evidence suggesting
arson as the cause of the fire. 34  The defendants were consequently
arrested and convicted of conspiracy to burn real property.
there was no need to distinguish between primary and secondary evidence). For more detail
on the differences between primary and secondary evidence, see Jessica Forbes, Note, The
Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, and the Emasculation of the Fourth
Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1221 (1987).
26 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at * 1.
27 Id. at *5. Therefore, the court ruled that the second-hand discovery and resulting search
and seizure of a marijuana growing operation occurring as a result of a warrantless search,
when no emergency exception continued to exist, infringed on a person's Fourth Amend-
ment and New York Constitutional rights.
28 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
29 Id. at 507-08.
30 Id. at 501.
31 Id. at 501-02.
32 Id at 502.
13 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 502.
34 Id at 503. The Court noted that all the entries and seizures were made without warrants
or the consent of the defendants. Id at 502-03.
35 Id. at 501.
688 [Vol. 27
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The Supreme Court faced numerous issues involving the war-
rantless searches and seizures that occurred at the premises after the
emergency ended. The Court determined that victims of a fire main-
tain a reasonable expectation of privacy even after a fire occurs in
their home.3 6  The Court reasoned that even after a fire has taken
place in a home, residents and their personal belongings continue to
live and remain on the property."
Furthermore, the Court made a requirement for post-fire in-
vestigations, stating: "[e]ven though a fire victim's privacy must
normally yield to the vital social objective of ascertaining the cause
of the fire, the magistrate can perform the important function of pre-
venting harassment by keeping that invasion to a minimum" by is-
suing a warrant based on reasonable cause.38
Under prior case law, the Court stated that the "basic purpose
of this Amendment . .. is to safeguard the privacy and security of in-
dividuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."39
However, the Court in Tyler recognized that there were certain situa-
tions in which a warrantless entry "may be legal when there is com-
pelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant." 4 0
Id. at 505.
' Tyler, 436 U.S. at 505 ("[The argument] that innocent fire victims inevitably have no
protectible [sic] expectations of privacy in whatever remains of their property -- is contrary
to common experience.").
Thus, there is no diminution in a person's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy nor in the protection of the Fourth Amendment simply because the
official conducting the search wears the uniform of a firefighter rather
than a policeman, or because his purpose is to ascertain the cause of a
fire rather than to look for evidence of a crime . ... Searches for admin-
istrative purposes, like searches for evidence of crime, are encompassed
by the Fourth Amendment. And, under that Amendment, "[O]ne go-
verning principle, justified by history and by current experience, has
consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasona-
ble' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."
Id. at 506 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).
3 Id. at 507-08. "[O]fficial entries to investigate the cause of a fire must adhere to the
warrant procedures of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 508. See See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967).
3 Camara, 387 U.S. at 528.
40 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (prevent destruction of evidence); United States v. Ur-
ban, 710 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1983) (presence of explosive chemicals justified warrantless in-
vestigation); United States v. Francis, 327 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2003) (methamphetamine lab
5
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These "emergency exceptions" are used to circumvent Fourth
Amendment warrant requirements. 4 1 The Court concluded that war-
rantless entries by firefighters during a fire are neither arbitrary inva-
sions nor unconstitutional, and that "once in a building for this pur-
pose, firefighters may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view." 4 2
As a result, the Court held that the defendants' constitutional rights
"were not violated by the entry of the firemen to extinguish the fire
. . . [or by the] removal of the two plastic containers of flammable
liquid." 43
A warrant is not required in order to investigate a fire once the
last flame has been extinguished." The Court held that "officials
need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to in-
vestigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished," as time
is needed afterward to preserve evidence or seek out continuing dan-
gers.45 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that "if the warrantless entry
to put out the fire and determine its cause is constitutional, the war-
rantless seizure of evidence while inspecting the premises for these
purposes also is constitutional." 4 6
Applying its reasoning, the Court viewed the re-entry of the
fire chief and the police approximately five hours after the fire had
been put out as a continuation of the constitutional warrantless entry
made earlier when the fire was being extinguished. 7 However, the
was exigent circumstance); see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976)
("Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case . . . ." (quoting Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967))).
41 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *2.
42 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509 ("A burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient
proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable.' . . . [I]t would defy reason to suppose
that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a building structure to put out
the blaze."); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971) ("Where the initial
intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a
warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is
also legitimate.").
4 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509.
4 Id. at 509-10 (stating an opposite view "of the firefighting function is unrealistically
narrow, however. Fire officials are charged not only with extinguishing fires, but with find-
ing their causes").
45 Id. at 5 10 ("Immediate investigation may also be necessary to preserve evidence from
intentional or accidental destruction."). The Court further recognized that the roles of fire-
fighters in different circumstances vary. Id. at n.6.
46 Id. at 510.
47 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511.
690 [Vol. 27
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entries that occurred three weeks later were "clearly detached from
the initial exigency and warrantless entry."48 The Court concluded
that all the evidence obtained from these unconstitutional searches
was inadmissible. 49  The general guideline established by Tyler is
that "an entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the
building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries to investi-
gate ... must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing
administrative searches."o
The Supreme Court has held that in emergency situations po-
lice "may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course
of their legitimate emergency . . . ."" However, what is at issue is
whether the situation qualifies as an emergency, as shown by the Su-
preme Court decisions in Mincey v. Arizona5 2 and Michigan v. Clif-
ford.53 In Mincey, the Court stated that even though police did have
the right to respond to emergency situations, warrantless entries were
only reasonable when the officers believed someone's life or limb
was in jeopardy.5 4 Although the police officers were investigating a
murder in Mincey, a warrant was required because no emergency sit-
48 id.
49 id.
5o Id. at 511. Justice Stevens concurred with the majority opinion: "In this case, there ob-
viously was a special enforcement need justifying the initial entry to extinguish the fire, and
I agree that the search on the morning after the fire was a continuation of that entirely legal
entry." Id. at 514 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice White, with whom Justice Marshall
agreed, stated: "The fact that the firemen were willing to leave demonstrates that the exigent
circumstances justifying their original warrantless entry were no longer present." Tyler, 436
U.S. at 515 (White, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice White pointed out that the subse-
quent entries by the chief and police were for the purpose of gathering evidence of a crime.
Id. at 516. These searches were not in the scope of the original entry and therefore should
have required a warrant. "[S]earches for criminal evidence are of special significance under
the Fourth Amendment." Id. See also Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. Also dissenting, Justice
Rehnquist stated that all the entries made were "reasonable" and therefore did not violate the
defendants' Fourth Amendment rights. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 516-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning was based on the fact that the premises had obtained substan-
tial damage and could not have been used in its post-fire condition. Id. at 517.
51 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (citing Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509; Coolidge,
403 U.S. at 465).
52 437 U.S. 385.
" 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
54 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93 (citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.
Cir. 1963)).
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uation existed to preserve life, limb, or evidence.s5 In Clifford, the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify its opinion in Tyler.56 Although
both Clifford and Tyler encompass officials performing a post-fire ar-
son investigation, the Court focused on the post-fire search in regard
to a criminal investigation." The Court held that a search warrant
was necessary for any post-fire criminal investigation because it ex-
ceeded the scope of the emergency exceptions." However, "[i]f evi-
dence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a valid . .
. search, it may be seized under the 'plain view' doctrine."5 9 There-
fore, under federal law "[a]n object that comes into view during such
a search may be preserved without a warrant." 60
Brigham City v. Stuart61 illustrates the seminal difference be-
tween federal law and New York law in regard to the Fourth
Amendment.62 In Brigham, officers responded to a noise complaint
and witnessed an altercation among party-goers inside a residence.63
The officers yelled from outside that they were present, and upon ob-
serving no response, entered the home.M As a result, three adults
were charged with disorderly conduct, intoxication, and contributing
to the delinquency of a minor. 65 The Court faced the issue of wheth-
er the officers' warrantless entry into the home was a violation of the
defendants' Fourth Amendment rights.66 Holding that it was not, the
Court revisited its prior cases, stating: "law enforcement officers may
make a warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and in-
vestigate its cause, to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence,
or to engage in 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect." 67 Along with those
15 Id. at 393-94 ("There was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or re-
moved during the time required to obtain a search warrant.").
1 Clifford, 464 U.S. at 289 ("We granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appears to exist as
to the application of our decision in Tyler." (citing Michigan v. Clifford, 459 U.S. 1168
(1983) (writ of certiorari))).
" Id at 294.
ss Id at 294-95.
5 Id at 294 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465).
6 Id. at 295 n.6.
6' 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
62 See Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *3 n.6.
63 Brigham, 547 U.S. at 400-01.
6 Id at 401.
~'Id
66 Id at 400.
67 Id at 403, 406 (citing Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509; Ker, 374 U.S. at 40; United States v. San-
692 [Vol. 27
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emergency exceptions, the exigency to assist a person who is serious-
ly injured or threatened also justifies warrantless conduct. 68 The de-
fendants argued that the officers' entry into the home was motivated
to make arrests, rather than quell violence, and that searches under
the emergency exceptions to the Fourth Amendment "may not be
'primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.' "69 The
Court rejected that argument, stating that: "An action is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's
state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justi-
fy the action." 0 Therefore, the motivation or intent of the officers
was irrelevant:
Our prior cases make clear that the subjective motiva-
tions of the individual officers ... have no bearing on
whether a particular seizure is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. It therefore does not matter
here-even if their subjective motives could be so
neatly unraveled-whether the officers entered the
kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence
against them or to assist the injured and prevent fur-
ther violence.n
Thus, when searching a premises or seizing evidence, the Su-
preme Court has made clear that the subjective intentions or motiva-
tions of the official conducting the search does not make a search il-
legal.72
The circuit courts have heard numerous emergency exception
tana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976)).
68 Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403. More recently, in Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 549
(2009) (per curium), the Supreme Court held that "Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a
likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." Instead, the
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and it sufficed to invoke the emer-
gency exception doctrine because the officers reasonably believed the defendant had hurt
himself. Id. at 548-49.
69 Brigham, 547 U.S. at 404 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506, 513 (Utah
2005)).
70 Id. at 403 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000); Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
" Brigham, 547 U.S. at 404-05 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Id. at 404.
9
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cases, which are important to the current jurisprudence of alleged
Fourth Amendment violations. Prior to Tyler, in United States v.
Brand,3 the circuit court opined on the warrantless entry of officers
subsequent to an emergency situation.74 In Brand, the defendant
overdosed and was in need of medical treatment.7 5  An ambulance
and a police officer were dispatched to the scene, entered the defen-
dant's home, and discovered evidence of drug paraphernalia. 76 The
officer then called for backup, who arrived after the defendant had
been placed in the ambulance and the medical emergency had
passed. The court faced the issue of whether the backup officers'
warrantless entry into the defendant's home was a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.7 8 Although the medical emergency sub-
sided, the court viewed that the medical personnel initially legally in-
vaded the privacy interest of the defendant, and therefore additional
officials or investigators were able to join the "search" as long as the
subsequent entries were confined to the scope of the original inva-
sion.7 9  The items found during the initial intrusion were in plain
view and the additional officers confined themselves to the area in
which the original legal warrantless search occurred; therefore, the
seizure of evidence was legal and admissible.o
However, two years after Brand, the Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Hoffman,8 ' determined that once the emergency situation
ended, so have the rights of officials or investigators to freely search
a person's home.82 In Hoffman, once a fire was under control, the
firefighters followed routine procedure and removed the defendant's
smoldering mattress, under which they discovered a sawed-off shot-
gun. 83 Approximately thirty minutes after the fire was extinguished,
a police officer arrived at the scene and was informed about the wea-
n 556 F.3d 1312 (5th Cir. 1977).
74 Id. at 1317.
7 Id at 1314.
76 Id
n Id. at 1314, 1317 n.8.
78 Brand, 556 F.2d at 1317.
7 Id. at 1317-19 n.9. See, e.g., Green, 474 F.2d at 1390.
so Brand, 556 F.2d at 1318-19.
8' 607 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1979).
82 Id. at 283.
83 Id. at 282.
694 [Vol. 27
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pon.84 As a result, the police officer entered the premises and seized
the gun.85 The court reasoned that "[a]bsent exigent circumstances
giving [the officer] a right to be in the trailer, the plain view observa-
tion of the shotgun would be tainted by the officer's unlawful pres-
ence and the shotgun would be rendered inadmissible as the 'fruit' of
the illegal entry."8 6 Although the court, citing Tyler, recognized the
rights of firefighters to enter a burning building without a warrant and
remain there for a reasonable time after the fire was extinguished, the
majority found the emergency exception doctrine inapplicable.8 The
fire had been extinguished and "[t]he mere fact that a fire has oc-
curred does not give police officers Carte blanche to enter one's
home, even when armed with probable cause to suspect that evidence
of a crime may be within the premises."8 8 The court explained its re-
jection of the exception, stating that the "gun was not a fire hazard
nor, with firemen securing the trailer and with appellant confined ...
was there any necessity to seize the weapon in order to protect it
from destruction."8
Distinguishing Brand, the court held that the officer exceeded
the scope of the initial search: the officer "did not enter the trailer to
aid in extinguishing the blaze or to investigate its cause. His only
purpose . . . was to seize evidence of an unrelated federal crime." 90
The mere fact that the officer physically confined himself to the de-
fendant's trailer where the firefighters had been, did not control the
Fourth Amendment inquiry. 91 "[N]o citizen should reasonably ex-
pect that, because a fire has occurred in his home, and certain few of-
ficials may enter, any sort of public officer may thereafter invade his
home for purposes unrelated to the initial intrusion." 92
In United States v. Parr,93 the Eleventh Circuit applied the
reasoning from Tyler to a non-arson case. The circuit court faced a
84 id.
85 id.
86 Hoffman, 607 F.2d at 283 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87
(1963); United States v. Dugger, 603 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1979)).
87 Hoffman, 607 F.2d at 283 (citing Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509).
88 Id.
89 Id
90 Id. at 284.
91 Id.
92 Hoffman, 607 F.2d at 285.
9 716 F.2d 796 (11 th Cir. 1983).
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case involving the post-fire investigation summoning of a police of-
ficer to seize evidence. 94 In Parr, after the fire department extin-
guished a fire at the defendant's home, they performed a routine
sweep of the house for salvageable property and noticed counterfeit
bills in the kitchen. 95 The fire marshal contacted the police, who re-
sponded to the scene, counted the money, and eventually seized the
evidence. 96 The court considered whether fire officials had the abili-
ty to freely search the home in order to salvage valuables for the vic-
tim of the fire, and held that when firefighters were engaged in a pur-
pose that was not clearly defined as one of their core duties,
"searches of a burned dwelling . . . after the fire has been extin-
guished, do not fall within the exigent circumstances created by the
fire and thus are unlawful in the absence of a warrant." 97 Therefore a
warrant is necessary for any search not related to the core duties of
firefighters.98
When determining the constitutionality of a search and sei-
zure, it is also important to consider state law. The primary New
York State authority for the emergency exceptions to warrant re-
quirements comes from the leading New York Court of Appeals case,
People v. Mitchell.99 In Mitchell, a resident of a hotel called the po-
lice asking for assistance in locating a missing maid.'00 After search-
ing most of the hotel, the police arrived at the hotel room of the de-
fendant, who stated that he did not know where the maid was and
consented to a search of his room.' 1 The officers took a quick
glance of the room and departed the scene. 102 However, a few hours
later, a detective of the New York City Homicide Squad arrived at
the hotel, obtained a management passkey, accessed the defendant's
94 Id. at 801.
95 Id
96 id
9'Id. at 810, 812.
98 Parr, 716 F.2d at 812. The court further concluded that the ease of proceeding without
a warrant did not render a search legal, because the necessity of warrants in these situations
protects the privacy interests of individuals. Id. at 812 n.18 ("The mere fact that law en-
forcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth
Amendment. The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unne-
cessary." (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393)).
99 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976).
'0o Id. at 608.
102 Id
102 id.
[Vol. 27696
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/11
2011] EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO FOURTH AMENDMENT 697
room, and discovered bloodstains on the bedding, and eventually, the
mutilated body.'03
The defendant claimed that the detective's entry into his room
was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because the officer
did not have a warrant or probable cause.104 The court set the stan-
dard for applying the emergency exception doctrine, stating: first,
that "[t]he police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there
is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance
for the protection of life or property."' Second, that "[t]he search
must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evi-
dence."' 06  Lastly, that "[t]here must be some reasonable basis, ap-
proximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area
or place to be searched." 07 Applying these guidelines, the court held
that the warrantless entry and search by the detective was not a
Fourth Amendment violation because: the primary intent was to find
the maid, the emergency situation of a missing person was justified,
and the detective had a reasonable basis to search the immediate loca-
tion of where the maid went missing, which included the defendant's
room. 108
In its first case dealing with post-fire warrantless search and
seizures, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Cal-
houn' 09 based on the Supreme Court's holding in Tyler. In Calhoun,
after firefighters were unable to determine if a fire was completely
extinguished, they sought the assistance of fire investigators to aid
them in a final search. 0 Four hours later, the investigators inspected
the residence for any signs of arson and soon discovered bum pat-
103 Id at 608-09.
'0 Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
105 Id.
106 id.
107 Id. (citing Edward G. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Re-
quirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L. REv. 419,425-29 (1973)).
108 Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609-11 ("The search of defendant's room was not interdicted
by the Fourth Amendment because it was triggered in response to an emergency situation
and was not motivated by the intent to apprehend . . . or to seize evidence."). However, the
court did note that warrantless searches will still be closely scrutinized for any constitutional
infractions and that the "reasonableness" of the search is the benchmark of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 611 (citing People v. Martinez, 339 N.E.2d 162, 167 (N.Y. 1975)).
109 402 N.E.2d 1145 (N.Y. 1980).
0 Id. at 1146.
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terns caused by a liquid accelerant."' The Court of Appeals faced
the issue of whether the warrantless search by fire investigators, after
the fire had already been extinguished, was constitutional.112 Al-
though the court noted that the rights of citizens are not diminished
"simply because one's home has been ravaged by fire," the court
found that the entry by the fire investigators satisfied Mitchell's
emergency exception guidelines." 3 The emergency exception "sanc-
tions warrantless searches and seizures in circumstances . . . [with
the] threat of destruction or removal of contraband or other evidence
of criminality.""14 Although the fire had died out, the chance that a
hidden danger still existed was apparent." 5 Looking at the intent of
the fire investigators, the court stated that their duties were to ex-
amine fires with an undetermined origin."' The investigators were
not told in advance that arson was the cause of the blaze, which ne-
gated any motive to seize evidence and satisfied the second Mitchell
element." 7 Finally, the court, relying on Tyler, held that the investi-
gators' entry four hours after the firefighters had extinguished the fire
was another part of the overall mission to fight a fire."'
The New York Court of Appeals has never applied the ideol-
ogy implemented in Brigham on the question of intent during a
search." 9 For this reason the federal and New York State laws on
"' Id. at 1146-47.
112 Id. at 1148.
113 Id at 1147-48.
114 Calhoun, 402 N.E.2d at 1148.
" Id.
116 Id. at 1148-49.
117 Id. at 1149 ("Thus, had there been a finding that the visit to the premises was moti-
vated instead primarily by an intent to gather support for an arson prosecution, the warrant-
less intrusion might well have exceeded the bounds of the emergency exception and tres-
passed on the constitutional guarantee."). See Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
"1 Calhoun, 402 N.E.2d at 1150.
In the circumstances of this case, we hold that the warrantless search of
the defendant's residential apartment by two fire marshals in the after-
math of a fire whose cause they were intent on discovering did not abuse
the proscriptions of either the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution or the comparable protection to be found in section 12 of article I
of our State Constitution.
Id. at 1146.
"' Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *3 n.6 ("The Court of Appeals has not yet decided
whether to adopt Brigham City's holding or to retain Mitchell's stricter standard."). See
People v. Dallas, 865 N.E.2d 1, I (N.Y. 2007).
[Vol. 27698
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warrantless searches differ. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision of
Brigham, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Knapp,120
was faced with the issue of whether a warrantless search of the de-
fendant's home by police officers violated his constitutional rights.121
Although no fire existed in Knapp, the court still reviewed the emer-
gency exception doctrine.' 22 Juxtaposing the New York and United
States Constitutions, the court stated: "we start with the reminder that
our Constitutions accord special protection to a person's expectation
of privacy in his own home." 23 The purpose of the emergency doc-
trine is to justify an exigent circumstance where it would be "imposs-
ible to obtain a warrant in sufficient time to preserve evidence or con-
traband threatened with removal or destruction."l 24 On this premise,
the court in Knapp reasoned that no emergency situation existed
where drugs were recovered after the emergency subsided, and there-
fore the search was illegal.125 In circumstances where drugs are re-
covered after an emergency situation the court stated that the warrant-
less seizure was unconstitutional:
The constitutional protections do not hinge upon
whether drugs or other contraband are capable of easy
removal or destruction. Absent any showing that they
were self-destructible . . . , the fact that they were
beyond the reach of any destructive agency, human or
mechanical, ruled out any inherent exigency.' 26
The court was not sympathetic to the People's argument that the fur-
ther entries by law enforcement personnel were a continuation of the
initial legal entry.127 "There was therefore no excuse for proceeding
without a warrant, unless it was the personal impatience or inconve-
nience of the police, considerations which never may be permitted to
120 422 N.E.2d 531 (1981).
121 Id. at 532 ("[W]e are called upon to decide whether the warrantless search of defen-
dant's home, conducted at the time of his arrest, was reasonable within the meaning of our
Constitutions.") (citations omitted).
122 Id. at 534.
123 Id. at 533.
124 Id. at 534-35 (quoting People v. Vaccaro, 348 N.E.2d 886, 889 (1976)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
125 Knapp, 422 N.E.2d at 535.
126 id
127 id
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outweigh the constitutional interests at stake." 28
As present case law stands, the New York Court of Appeals
still reads article I, section 12 (New York's equivalent of the Fourth
Amendment) with the three guidelines applied in Mitchell.129  In
People v. Molnar,'30 the New York Court of Appeals permitted evi-
dence at trial that had been seized pursuant to the emergency excep-
tion.131 In this case the emergency exception applied to the uncover-
ing of a murder victim's body.132 The court in Molnar held that the
officers had a reasonable belief that: an emergency existed; the search
was not motivated by an intent to arrest or seize evidence; and there
was a reasonable basis to believe the emergency existed in the place
where the search was conducted. 133 The majority touched upon the
issue of intent and stated that "even if the possibility of the involve-
ment of criminal agency was present in the minds of the searching of-
ficers, this contingency was not the primary motivation for the search
. . . .134 Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed that
intent is essential to a determination of whether a warrantless search
is constitutional.135
In its first and most recent Fourth Amendment review since
the Supreme Court's holding in Brigham, the New York Court of
Appeals, in People v. Dallas,13 6 faced the issue of whether a search of
the defendant's apartment was properly conducted under the emer-
gency doctrine.' 3 1 In its brief opinion, the court restated the three
elements of the emergency doctrine formulated in Mitchell'38 and
stated: "[w]e have no occasion to consider whether our holding in
Mitchell should be modified in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Brigham City v. Stuart."l39 Thus, the court recognized the differ-
ence that Brigham brought to the emergency exception doctrine.
128 Id. (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981)).
129 See Dallas, 865 N.E.2d at 1.
130 774 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 2002).
'3' Id at 738.
132 id
'' Id at 740-43.
1' Molnar, 774 N.E.2d at 741 n.4.
6 865 N.E.2d 1.
Id. at 1.
138 Id (citing Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609).
"3 Id See Brigham, 547 U.S. at 404.
700 [Vol. 27
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However, a recent appellate division dissent in People v. Edwards,140
which resulted in a three-to-two decision, the dissent touched upon
the Supreme Court's ruling in Brigham.141 Justices Scudder and Pe-
radotto dissented, stating: "The validity of police conduct is not
measured by the subjective intentions of the law enforcement officers
. ... Rather, it is measured by the objective circumstances, deter-
mined pursuant to a reasonable person standard." 4 2
In People v. Guins,43 1long before the holding Brigham, the
appellate division reaffirmed the question of intent during a warrant-
less search.'44 In Guins, the court faced the issue of "whether evi-
dence seized by the police, without a warrant, from defendant's
apartment following a fire, should have been suppressed." 45 The fire
department and fire investigator responded to a fire, entered the
apartment to search for damage, and found a security box surrounded
by empty glassine envelopes.146 Shortly thereafter, the police arrived
to inspect "some alleged drug paraphernalia and some possible con-
traband in the closet" that the fire investigator had brought to the po-
lice's attention.147  The police removed the security box, opened it,
and discovered three kilograms of cocaine. 148 The court held that the
search and seizure by the police was unconstitutional, and stated:
"The fact that defendant was a victim of a fire of unknown origin did
not diminish her right of privacy in her home."l 49 Furthermore, it
was deemed unconstitutional because the police's intent when enter-
ing the defendant's apartment was to seize evidence of a crime. 0
The emergency exception doctrine did not justify the entrance of the
police officer, as "[t]he police had ample time to seek a warrant if
they wanted to seize the security box."' 5 ' Therefore, when evidence
140 884 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2009).
141 Id. at 533 (Scudder, J. & Peradotto, J., dissenting).
142 id.
143 569 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1991).
' Id. at 541.
145 id.
146 id.
147 Id. at 542 (internal quotations omitted).
148 Guins, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
149 Id. at 542-44.
150 Id. at 543. Cf Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609 ("The search must not be primarily moti-
vated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.").
15t Guins, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 543. Cf People v. Stevens, 871 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 2008) (finding officers were not motivated by intent to seize evidence).
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of a crime is found by firefighters, a warrantless entry by another law
enforcement officer cannot be motivated by the intent to seize that
particular evidence.15 2
In People v. Crawford,'53 the court held contrary to the opi-
nion in Guins, and showed how a non-fire official's motive to search
a premise was not in violation of the emergency exception guide-
lines.154 In Crawford, after firefighters forcibly entered the defen-
dant's apartment to fight a fire, a police officer on the scene checked
for property damage, observed bags filled with crack cocaine in plain
view, and seized the evidence.15 5 Unlike Guins, the court found that
the warrantless entry and seizure by the police met the requirements
of the emergency exception because the firefighters "did not inform
the police" officer of the criminal contraband.156 Because the officer
entered the premises without the intent to seize evidence of a crime,
and the evidence that was seized was in plain view, it was not sup-
pressed.157
In People v. Christianson,'5 the court established a definitive
answer as to when a search warrant is required subsequent to a fire.'59
In Christianson, after a furnace fire was extinguished, the smoke
cleared, and the cause of the fire known, the fire chief proceeded to
investigate a boarded up section of the defendant's mobile home.160
The chief contacted the police, reported the questionable barricade,
and entered the defendant's home with the police to view the locked
interior room.' 6 ' The police noticed a small amount of marijuana in
the defendant's living area and demanded that he unlock the interior
room, revealing a marijuana growing operation.162 The court in
Christianson, citing Guins, held that the officer's warrantless entry
and subsequent seizure of the marijuana was illegal and the emergen-
152 Guins, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
' 747 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2002).
154 Id. at 619.
'I" Idat 618-19.
I6 Idat 619.
" Id. at 618-19. See People v. Brown, 749 N.E.2d 170, 176-78 (N.Y. 2001), for the New
York Court of Appeals' analysis on the plain view doctrine.
i' 869 N.Y.S.2d 723 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008).
" Id. at 724.
'60 Id. at 723-24.
161 Id. at 724.
162 Id.
702 [Vol. 27
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/11
2011] EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO FOURTH AMENDMENT 703
cy exception inapplicable, because: the fire had already been extin-
guished, the home had been ventilated, and the purpose of the offic-
er's presence was to investigate the safety concerns exhibited by the
boarded room.' 63  Simply put, the duties of the firefighters had been
completed, therefore, the emergency exception did not apply and the
further entry and search by the officer was subject to a search war-
rant. 164
Each case cited by the Saldana court conveyed that warrant-
less searches are per se unreasonable.165 The court cited to the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in Tyler to elucidate what the emergency
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment entailed.166 Although the Sal-
dana court cited to federal cases, it is clear the court followed state
law in determining that Officer March's entry was illegal. Implicitly,
the court used New York precedent, among them Mitchell, to list the
three requirements of the emergency exception.167 Although the facts
of each case were slightly different than the facts in Saldana, the
court reasoned that Officer March's warrantless entry into Saldana's
home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 68 The court deter-
mined that the officer's entry went beyond the scope of the emergen-
cy exception, and therefore required a warrant in order seize the mari-
juana plants.169
New York and the federal government are not the only courts
facing post-fire issues; in fact, other states have faced analogous cir-
cumstances.o70 However, when looking to New York cases, it is im-
163 Christianson, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 724. The court held that the safety concerns did not fall
within the scope of the emergency exception and did not pose a safety hazard to the defen-
dant. Id. See Guins, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 543; see generally Molnar, 774 N.E.2d at 741; Mit-
chell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
164 Christianson, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
165 See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390 (noting "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment" (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))); Calhoun, 402
N.E.2d at 1147 (finding that "a warrantless intrusion by a government official is presump-
tively unreasonable" (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970))).
166 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *2 (citing Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511).
167 Id (citing Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609).
16s Id. at *1, 2.
169 id.
170 See Washington v. Bell, 737 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987). In Bell, police officers seized
material from a marijuana growing operation without a warrant after it had been discovered
by firefighters during the extinguishing of a fire. Id. at 255. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington held that the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 255-56; see also
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portant to note that the facts in Saldana are of first impression in New
York's court system. In the post-fire warrantless search cases which
New York has decided, the courts have frequently held that once the
fire has been extinguished, the emergency exception ceases, and all
further entries require a warrant.17 1  Saldana relied on New York
precedent; however, the New York Court of Appeals has never de-
cided whether the Mitchell guidelines survive the Supreme Court's
recent abrogation of the intent requirement in Brigham. Until this re-
view occurs, future cases will surely question the Mitchell guide-
lines.172
When comparing the merits of the arguments posed by the
majority and the dissenting opinions in Tyler, it is clear that the issue
of whether a warrantless search of a house post-fire is constitutional
is one which will continue to test the court system. The majority did
not clarify what exactly is considered a reasonable time for officials
to remain after a fire has been extinguished. Furthermore, the Court
Connecticut v. Eady, 733 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1999). In Eady, firefighters responded to a fire
and while performing routine firefighter duties, discovered marijuana. Id at 115. The fire-
fighters conveyed the discovery to police officers at the scene. Id. The police officers en-
tered and seized the marijuana without a warrant. Id. The high court of Connecticut con-
cluded that the seizure was valid under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 123. See also Mazen
v. Seidel, 940 P.2d 924, 930 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that the entry by police to seize evidence
of a growing operation discovered during routine firefighter procedure was lawful under the
Fourth Amendment). But see People v. Dajnowicz, 204 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Mich. 1972)
(holding that the police entry to seize evidence discovered by firefighters was a violation of
the defendant's Constitutional rights).
"' E.g., Guins, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 553; Christianson, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
172 See People v. Rodriguez, 907 N.Y.S.2d 294, 297-98 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010). Here,
the Second Department held:
[T]he decision in Brigham City created a conflict between the Fourth
Amendment and New York law. However, since we find that the police
in this case were presented with an emergency under both the Mitchell
test and the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Brigham
City, we need not reach the issue of whether the New York Constitution
requires retention of the 'subjective motivation' prong of the Mitchell
test.
Id. at 297. See also People v. Leggett, 904 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010)
("[I]n light of the United States Supreme Court's determination in Brigham City v. Stuart
that '[t]he officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant' to Fourth Amendment analysis, an
inquiry into the subjective motivations of the police is no longer necessary in determining
whether that amendment was violated.") (citation omitted); see also People v. Desmarat, 833
N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007) ("Regardless of whether the New York State
Constitution requires retention of the Mitchell standard, an issue we need not reach here, we
find that, under the circumstances, the police were presented with an emergency situation
under both the Mitchell rule and the Brigham City rule.") (citations omitted).
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in Tyler did not consider the issue of whether the police should have
obtained a warrant during the first entry into the burned premises be-
cause they were a member of a different law enforcement agency.
Given the Supreme Court's holding, it is apparent that the
New York City Court of Watertown did not properly apply the Tyler
decision when deciding Saldana. The decision reached in Saldana is
inconsistent with the reasoning in Tyler. Tyler and Saldana have two
distinct fact patterns. Because the decision in Tyler is devoid of
whether the police's initial entry into the furniture store was a viola-
tion of the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights, the court in Salda-
na should have mentioned that this vital issue was not considered by
the Supreme Court. The Court in Tyler held that the fire chief and
police's entry onto the burned property five hours after the fire had
been extinguished was constitutional. Therefore, if the court in Sal-
dana correctly applied the reasoning and holding of the Supreme
Court, it would have found that Officer March's initial entry into Sal-
dana's house was not a Fourth Amendment violation.'
In Saldana, no emergency existed at the time of Officer
March's entry. The facts clearly show that the fire had been put out
prior to the officer gaining entrance into the defendant's attic.'74 It
was explicitly clear in Tyler's progeny, Clifford, that further post-fire
entries to investigate must be made pursuant to a search warrant. Jus-
tice White's dissent in Tyler, clearly proposed this premise six years
earlier when he stated: "The state courts found that at the time of the
first re-entry a criminal investigation was under way and that the pur-
pose of the officers in re-entering was to gather evidence of crime.
Unless we are to ignore these findings, a warrant was necessary." 7 5
Unlike Parr, the emergency had already subsided when the officer
entered the defendant's living quarters, and the mere fact that the fire
had existed did not create an ongoing emergency. Officer March's
seizure of the marijuana should have been pursuant to a search war-
rant, evidenced by the Court's holding in Mincey. Furthermore, the
reasoning in Tyler, that evidence can be seized as long as the warrant-
less entry is determined to be constitutional, is not applicable to New
17 The better case to have used would have been Clifford, 464 U.S. at 293 (stating that
post-fire investigations of a person's residence requires a search warrant absent emergency
exceptions).
174 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at *1.
171 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
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York State law. Under New York General Municipal Law, firefight-
ers do not have the authority to seize evidence or partake in any crim-
inal investigation. 176
Although the New York Court of Appeals has yet to apply the
reasoning of Brigham, the decision in Saldana would most likely
have resulted in the same outcome. As Mitchell provided, there are
three guidelines to the application of the emergency exception. The
facts in Saldana reveal that Officer March was motivated to seize
evidence of criminality when he entered Saldana's residence. How-
ever, even without the second element of the Mitchell guidelines (of-
ficer's motivation to enter) the emergency exception would still not
have applied because it is clear that there was no threat of removal or
destruction of the defendant's fifteen marijuana plants. Therefore,
there was no threat of destruction of the evidence like Guins and
Knapp; Officer March had no excuse for proceeding without a war-
rant. Furthermore, juxtaposing Calhoun, Officer March's entry was
not in furtherance of the firefighter's duties and therefore the court
correctly distinguished Calhoun from the facts in Saldana.
One could argue that Officer March was only told that "they
were growing something in the attic" and, due to this broad state-
ment, he feared that an emergency existed.17 7 It seems that the state's
position was that the nature of what was told to Officer March could
have been construed to rise to the level of an emergency. However,
this theory stretches into the realm of hypotheticals; it would be irra-
tional to decide law on the People's optimistic forecast that a poten-
tial danger exists.
When looking to cases not cited by the court in Saldana, the
conclusion that a warrant is necessary for post-fire investigations is
clear. Like Hoffman, Officer March did not enter the defendant's
home while an emergency was present. Furthermore, the reasoning
in Saldana is akin to Hoffman: "The mere fact that a fire has occurred
does not give police officers Carte blanche to enter one's home, even
when armed with probable cause to suspect that evidence of a crime
may be within the premises."17 8
Therefore, Saldana's holding is proper when based on either
176 N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 209-c (McKinney 2010) ("Investigations of crimes and appre-
hension of criminals are not firemanic duties . . .
'7 Saldana, 2009 WL 4667446, at * 1.
.. Hoffman, 607 F.2d at 283.
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the three guidelines in Mitchell or the abrogation of intent in Brig-
ham. This ruling will inevitably be used to support the proposition
that law enforcement, in the absence of exigent circumstances, must
obtain a valid warrant to seize evidence of a crime, even though the
item was primarily discovered in plain view during a lawful warrant-
less post-fire investigation by a separate public official.
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